Rodney and the Breaking of the Line by Peter Trew

Author:Peter Trew
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: george rodney, lord rodney, admiral rodney, royal navy, french, british, british navy, naval warfare
Publisher: eBookPartnership.com
Published: 2013-06-30T16:00:00+00:00

Hood's captains were also issued with these after they came under Graves's command,33 but there was very little time available for briefing or tactical exercises on the way from Sandy Hook to the Chesapeake. According to an authoritative analysis, what Graves intended by his 2.30 pm signal, consistent with Arbuthnot's signals and instructions, was that the whole fleet should alter course together to starboard in conformity with the movement of the leading ship, enabling the fleet to run down 'on a lasking course to engage', i.e. on a slanting course on a line of bearing parallel to the enemy line, so that all ships engaged at the same time.34 What actually happened was that the ships astern of the Shrewsbury, all West Indies ships, misunderstood the signal and altered course not together but in succession, following in the Shrewsbury's wake. The result of this misunderstanding was that the British van approached the French van in line ahead at an angle and were thus unable to use their own guns although exposed to enemy fire.

Graves repeated the misunderstood signal twice and at 3.46 pm made the signal for line ahead at one cable followed by the signal for all ships to bear down and engage their opponents. At 4.11 pm the signal for line ahead was hauled down 'that it might not interfere with the signal to engage close'. That should have removed any misunderstanding as to what Graves intended. Ships began to bear down on the enemy, but unfortunately the Montagu, eighth in the line (in reverse order) and two ships ahead of the London, luffed up and opened fire at too great a range, forcing the ships immediately astern of her, including the London, also to luff up to avoid getting between her and the enemy. To restore an orderly formation and to push forward the ships which had luffed up prematurely Graves hoisted the signal for line ahead at 4.22 pm and at the same time hauled down the signal for close action. Five minutes later he restored the signal for close action and according to his own account hauled down the signal for line ahead.35However, Hood was adamant, and his assertion was corroborated by White, that the signal for line ahead was not hauled down until about 5.30 pm and that it remained hoisted together with the signal for close action. He decided that the signal for line ahead must prevail and called back the ships in his rear division which had begun to bear down on the enemy.36 He ordered them to bear down again when he perceived that the signal for line ahead had been hauled down at 5.30 pm, but the French were then too far to leeward to enable him to achieve anything before firing ceased. According to the London's log the signal for close action was repeated at 5.20 pm and it confirms that the rear division bore down to engage at 5.30 pm but it does not support Hood's contention that the signal for line ahead had remained in force until then.

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